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THE CLASS CONTENT OF PREFERENCES TOWARDS ANTI-INFLATION
AND ANTI-UNEMPLOYMENT POLICIES

Arjun Jayadev
Deparment of Economics
University of Massachusetts, Boston1

This paper assesses class based preferences towards anti-inflationary and antiunemployment policy. Using a consistent cross-country social survey, I find that the
working class broadly defined, and those with lower occupational skill and status are
more likely to prioritize combating unemployment rather than inflation. The result is
robust to the inclusion of several plausible controls. The idea that the working class is
less ‘relatively inflation averse’ is consistent with earlier predictions coming from large
body of political economy research in the 1970s. The finding that inflation and
unemployment aversion have a distinct class character has implications for current
debates on the implications of macroeconomic policies such as inflation targeting.
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Section (I): Introduction

From one important point of view, indeed, the avoidance of inflation and the
maintenance of full employment can be most usefully regarded as conflicting class
interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat respectively, the conflict being resolvable
only by the test of relative political power in the society.
Harry Johnson (Johnson, 1968, p 96)
Among the casualties of the advent of the rational expectations revolution in the 1970s
was a rich vein of political economy which analyzed the macroeconomic dynamics of
unemployment and inflation as deriving from distributive struggles between capitalists
and workers (Boddy and Crotty 1975, Rosenberg and Weisskopf 1980, Rowthorn 1977,
Bach and Stephenson 1974 Hibbs 1977). This approach often made explicit the class
conflict innate in Keynesian accounts of the Phillips curve trade-off and in considerations
of the natural rate of unemployment2. While the details of these studies varied, the
argument, with slight modifications, remained the same: workers and capitalists had
opposing and irreconcilable differences in the trade-off between inflation and
unemployment. Such ‘conflict theories’ not only gave political explanations for the
trajectory of inflation and unemployment, (most notably in the work of Hibbs 1977) but also
thereby provided direct predictions for the preferences of individuals towards antiunemployment and anti-inflation policies based on their position within the social
stratification. Specifically, the working class, broadly classified, is more concerned about
reducing unemployment than firm-owners. Unemployment reduces the lifetime income of
workers directly and also exerts a downward pressure on wages by reducing the
bargaining power of workers3. Inflation on the other hand worked to the advantage of those
workers with low savings.
With the rise of new classical macroeconomics in the 1970s and its subsequent hegemony
any trade-off between inflation and unemployment came to be seen as essentially shortterm and certainly could not be utilized by policy makers to affect macroeconomic
outcomes without incurring severe macroeconomic costs. As a consequence, much of the
macroeconomic literature moved away from class-based, political economy models of
inflation and unemployment towards what Iversen and Soskice 2006 elegantly call
2

Indeed, as Pollin, 1998, points out, class conflict is the implicit mechanism that drives the natural rate of
unemployment even in orthodox neoclassical accounts. As he puts it-“Marx and Kalecki also share a
common conclusion with natural rate proponents, in that they would all agree that positive unemployment
rates are the outgrowth of class struggle over distribution of income and political power. […] Of course,
Friedman and the New Classicals reach this conclusion via analytic and political perspectives that are
diametrically opposite to those of Marx and Kalecki. To put it in a nutshell, mass unemployment results in
the Friedmanite/New Classical view when workers demand more than they deserve, while for Marx and
Kalecki, capitalists use the weapon of unemployment to prevent workers from getting their just due."
(Pollin 1998)
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The idea of unemployment as a labor disciplining device has, of course, a provenance from Marx.
Marxist theories of the labor market maintain this as a key fact of the labor market (for example Bowles
1985)

macroeconomics which “..[F]ocuses attention on what democratic governments can do
wrong in the short term”. The prescription that followed was to replace government with
independent central banks, and discretionary macroeconomic policy with rules based
approaches such as inflation targeting (Barro & Gordon 1983, Cukierman 1992)
.
While Post-Keynesian and heterodox approaches never abandoned the idea of demand
management, the advent of New Keynesian economics restored the space in mainstream
economics for economic policy to have beneficial macroeconomic outcomes. As opposed to
rational expectations, there is a role for demand management and other policies when
imperfections arise due to wage and price rigidities whereby involuntary unemployment can
be reduced. The now long literature on the NAIRU continues to suggest that combating
inflation and unemployment involves two independent and potentially opposing targets4.
Given that there has been a restitution of space for macroeconomic policy, this paper
seeks to make a contribution in reconstructing the political or class content of
disinflationary and expansionary policy. Specifically, this paper seeks to provide some
evidence based on individual level observations for the contention that those in contrary
class positions respond very differently to policies engineered to combat inflation versus
those that are designed to combat unemployment. Using a unique social survey data for
1996, I verify the fact that there are substantial class based differences in what may be
termed ‘relative aversion’ to inflation and unemployment (a preference that policy is
designed to keep inflation down rather than unemployment down). Capitalists and highly
skilled workers are more likely to display relative inflation aversion than less skilled and
unskilled workers. As such, the paper has implications for the debate on anti-inflationary
policies and inflation targeting in particular as they apply to different countries.
In what follows, I very briefly summarize relevant research in the class impacts of inflation
and unemployment and attitudes towards these problems in section (II). Section (III)
describes the data that I use. Section (IV) presents the results of various logistic regressions.
Section (V) summarizes and concludes.

Section (II): Class and attitudes towards inflation and unemployment
The radical political economy approaches to macroeconomics saw unemployment as
acting as 'a regulator of class conflict' (Rowthorn 1977). Unemployment was the central
fulcrum of the labor-capital confrontation. Specifically, increases in unemployment
maintained a downward pressure on wages while tight labor markets increased factor
income going to labor by exerting upward pressure on wages (Boddy and Crotty 1975)5.
4
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For a recent review see Ball and Mankiw, 2002

Recent empirical studies, especially about the U.S experience of the nineties boom, support these ideas
indirectly. Bernstein and Baker (2003) find that the low unemployment period in the American economy of
the late 1990s aided in improving the welfare of workers according to several metrics. Real wages
increased after a generation of decline, and the inflation adjusted income of low income families grew by
twice the amount that they did in the eighties expansion ( when average unemployment was higher).

Conflict theories of inflation suggested that the rise in inflation was seen as the result of
perpetual claims by workers for wage increases ahead of productivity . The detrimental
impact of inflation was primarily on those who had nominally denominated assets whose
value was eroded with increasing prices, although there were also pressures on firms
which were unable to pass on higher wages as higher prices. To that extent the negative
impact of inflation was more pronounced on the capitalist and rentier class. As a result
these theories would predict pronounced differences in attitudes towards inflation and
unemployment depending on the respondent’s class position.
Drawing from this political economy research, empirical studies in the 1970s and 1980s
had begun to establish the class character of individuals’ preferences for inflation versus
unemployment aversion. Given objective evidence that periods of relatively low
unemployment and relatively high inflation coincided with an equalization of the
personal distribution of income, a larger share of national income going to labor versus
capital and a reduction in poverty as well as losses to those with savings in nominally
denominated assets (typically the rich), attitudes towards inflation and unemployment
had a class character. Hibbs 1977 summarizes the central findings from U.S and UK
surveys:
.. [P]opular concern about unemployment and inflation is class-related. Low and middle
income and occupational status groups are more averse to unemployment than inflation,
whereas, upper income and occupational status groups are more concerned about
inflation than unemployment… it does appear that the subjective preferences of class or
status groups are at least roughly in accordance with their objective economic interests…
Hibbs (1977:1470)
Recent studies of attitudes towards inflation and unemployment have largely ignored
class. While there is substantial empirical evidence from opinion research that both
inflation and unemployment are seen by respondents as disutilities (see, among others, Di
Tella et al 2001, Easterly and Fischer 2001 and Shiller 1997), there is less consensus on
the relative importance that individuals in different classes place on reducing each of
these. Part of the issue is simply that there have been few surveys done which explicitly
ask the respondent to rate their aversion to inflation versus unemployment if these were
alternative outcomes. As such, the data has limited researchers’ agenda. Equally, there
has been little interest in the characteristics of individuals who might support a policy
designed to combat inflation versus one that tackled unemployment. To the extent that
this has been undertaken, it has been to assess inflation aversion among the rich versus
the poor (Jayadev 2006, Easterly and Fischer 2002)6. There has been little to no recent
Abraham and Haltiwanger 1995 who review mainly US evidence suggest that real wages are more likely
to be pro-cyclical than counter-cyclical.
6

Scheve, 2003, 2004 remains an exception in providing more detailed evidence for the characteristics of
individuals supporting each policy.

work which attempts to look at politics and in particular class politics in the
determination of preferences towards anti-inflation and anti-unemployment policy. It is to
this exercise that we now turn.
Section (III): Data
Measuring Inflation Aversion
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) conducted by the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research in 1996 focuses on the preferences of more
than 30,000 individuals in twenty-seven7 different countries regarding the role of
government in society. The countries included include OECD economies, former eastern
bloc economies and unfortunately do not include any low income countries apart from
China8. Among the questions asked in this survey is the following:
If the government had to choose between keeping down inflation and keeping down
unemployment to which do you think it should give highest priority?
This is the key variable of analysis for the rest of the paper. I define a variable ‘relative
inflation aversion’ as taking a value of one when the respondent prefers that the
government prioritize reducing inflation rather than unemployment and zero when the
opposite holds.
While this provides a direct measure of the weights placed in an individual welfare
function on inflation as opposed to unemployment, it is not without some limitations.
Ideally, such a question might ask how much inflation the individual might accept for
reducing the level of unemployment and vice versa so as to have a more direct calibration
of the marginal rate of substitution in the social and individual welfare function.
However, the measure is certainly superior to questions which ask about inflation without
reference to unemployment or any other macroeconomic policy objective, thereby
providing no implicit budget constraint.
Figure 1 summarizes the average preference for keeping inflation rather than
unemployment down by country.
Some interesting observations suggest themselves. Nearly 42 % of the overall sample
report being relatively inflation averse. However, this masks large differences in the
average relative inflation aversion between countries, from a low of less than 20% of
respondents in France to a high of above 60% of respondents in the Czech Republic. In
only five countries out of twenty is the percentage of relatively inflation averse

7

In the survey, respondents from Israel and Germany are divided in two separate categories each. The
former is divided between Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews and the latter is split between East and West
Germans.
8
The next round of this survey is to be conducted during 2006 and will include many more developing
economies. The issue should certainly be revisited then.

respondents over half (and only in two countries-- West Germany and the Czech
Republic-- is the percentage overwhelmingly above the midway mark).

Measuring Class
Constructing readily comparable and objective measures of social class are fraught with
difficulties (See Leiulfsrud et al 2005 and Wright 1997 for an exposition on some of
these).Contemporary measures of class differ based on the elements that researchers
consider important to their theoretical approach--for example along lines of ownership,
management, career prospects, income, status, education or other such categories
(Carchedi 1978, Wright 1985, Esping-Andersen 1993, Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993).
However, not all of these are likely to bear directly upon the question of relative inflation
aversion. Class has relevance in as much as it reflects the labor market position of the
respondent and therefore his preferences to policies which enhances his or her position. It
is desirable therefore to utilize a definition which closely reflects the respondent’s
occupation and position as employer or worker.
In this paper, I utilize a few different measures of class. The ISSP dataset provides an
occupational variable based on the ISCO 1988 classification which has previously been
used by researchers to construct a wide array of measures of stratification. A first (crude)
method is to utilize the traditional Marxist division between firm owner and employee. If
the respondent is classified as self-employed with employees, he or she is classified as a
firm owner, and an employee otherwise. I define a dummy variable called firm owner
which takes the value of 1 if the respondent is self employed and has more than one
employee, and 0 otherwise.
Sociologists have expended enormous effort in providing more useful and sophisticated
categorizations of class. In order to perform a more satisfactory class analysis, I replicate
Wright’s (1985) scheme which divides the labor force into owners and wage laborers and
wage laborers in turn into three categories- experts, skilled and low-skilled. Wright uses
this to operationalize his idea of class locations and contradictions therein. Workers may
be divided according to their relative privilege in the labor process. Based on a careful
cataloging of occupations, Wright defines experts as those whose jobs require skills (and
in particular accredited or credentialed skills) and who are in scarce supply relative to
their demand by the market. Semi-skilled and unskilled class positions by contrast are
held by those who have uncredentialed or no skills and who are thus in abundant supply.
Using this approach has significant advantages. It makes theoretical sense for the
question at hand to conceive of class measures which reflect the respondent’s relationship
to the labor market and therefore to his or her bargaining power and probability of
continued employment. An expert for example, will typically enjoy a credential rent and
be more likely to have both a higher level of bargaining power and a lower probability of
being replaced than a low-skilled worker. He or she may therefore have opposing
ideological and political interests based to other workers. At the same time both an

unskilled worker and a skilled worker are more concerned about unemployment than a
capitalist9. Appendix 1 details the creation of the class variables.
.Figure 2 shows the average relative inflation aversion in each country for each grouping
of wage laborers. As is evident, in most countries, ‘experts’ are more relatively inflation
averse than semi-skilled and unskilled workers10, as might be expected given the logic
that more highly skilled workers enjoy greater bargaining power and a lower probability
of unemployment than lower skilled workers, but are equally likely to see their wages
eroded by inflation.
Another approach is to look at subjective evaluations of class categories. The ISSP
dataset asks respondents their own evaluation of their social class (the categories are
lower middle class/ upper working class, middle class, upper middle class and upper
class). Unlike more objective measures, subjective perceptions of class probably depend
on an amalgam of factors such as the respondent’s education, status, income and gender
as well as factors which are of direct relevance to the question of relative inflation
aversion—the respondent’s position and prospects in the labor market and the asset
market. Nevertheless, it is useful to look at this as a check on the robustness of the earlier
measure of class. I define three subjective class categories—the variable subjective lower
class takes a value of 1 when the respondent identifies as being in the lower class or in
the working class and 0 otherwise. Another variable subjective middle class takes a value
of 1 if the respondent is from the lower middle class or middle class and 0 otherwise.
Finally, the value of the variable subjective upper class takes a value of 1 when the
respondent is from the upper middle or upper class.
Table (I) provides summary statistics for all variables.
Section (IV): Results
In order to assess the class character of relative inflation aversion, I undertake a series of
logistic regressions of relative inflation aversion on the respondent’s class position.
Tables (II) and (III) provide the detailed results of these exercises
Columns (I)-(III) in table (I) are the results from performing the logistic regression on the
three definitions of class without any controls. As is evident from column (I), firm
owners are significantly more likely than workers to be relatively inflation averse (or less
likely to be relatively unemployment averse). Column (II) uses the classification for wage
laborers developed by Wright. The omitted dummy is expert workers and hence the
results suggest that as compared to experts, both low-skilled and skilled workers display
less relative inflation aversion suggests that in comparison with the omitted group.
Similarly, in column (III) in comparison to those who consider themselves upper class,
those who consider themselves middle and lower class are much less relatively inflation
averse.
9

This is an example of what Wright terms a contradictory class location.
The major exception is Israel- perhaps because of the impact that the period of hyperinflation in the
1970s had upon even skilled workers.
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Columns (I)-(III) in table (II) shows that these results persist in the presence of a variety
of plausible controls, including dummies for income, gender, age, employment status and
union membership. Column (I) shows that a firm owner is about a fourth more likely to
prefer anti-inflation to anti-unemployment policies as a worker. Column (II) shows that
relative to ‘experts’, semi-skilled are about eight-tenths and unskilled workers are about
nine-tenths as likely to report supporting anti-inflation to anti-unemployment policies.
The results in column (III) show that as compared to the subjective upper class,
subjective lower classes display significantly less inflation aversion. A respondent who
considers himself or herself as being part of the lower or lower middle class is about three
fourths as likely as someone who is in the upper class to prefer that the government keep
inflation down. A respondent in the middle or upper middle class is about eight-tenths as
likely as someone in the upper middle or upper class to prefer that inflation be kept down
rather than unemployment.
The results on the control variables are interesting to note. Income is controlled for using
dummies for income quintiles which take a value of 1 if the respondent is in that quintile
or 0 otherwise. The odds ratio on the income quintile dummies reiterate the findings of
Jayadev, 2006 - the poor are less relatively inflation averse than the rich, with each
income quintile below the richest (the omitted quintile) displaying monotonically
increasing inflation aversion, although in the second regression not all odds ratios are
significant. Not surprisingly, the unemployed are less likely than those who have
employment to prefer that the government pursue a policy of keeping inflation down
rather than unemployment in all the models. Gender matters: women report being more
relatively inflation averse than men. Trade-union members display statistically
significantly less relative inflation aversion than non-union members, perhaps because
union members can more easily bargain their wages upwards than non-union members in
the face of rising prices. Somewhat surprisingly, age does not appear to have a
statistically significant impact on an individual’s relative inflation aversion either when
expressed simply or as a categorical variable. These general results are quite robust to a
host of other controls for individual characteristics, including household size, whether the
respondent is based in an urban area or not, marital status, whether the respondent is
employed in the public sector or the private sector and so on.
Section (V): Conclusion
In the last three decades, the hopeful message of Keynesian demand management has
fallen out of favor with policy makers; as more faith has been placed in market based
solutions, in independent central banks and in microeconomic interventions to handle the
problems of inflation and unemployment. The theoretical impetus for this shift was
provided by the rational expectations revolution of the 1970s and subsequent new
classical analyses of the state. These in turn argued that democratic governments were
often bad for macroeconomic efficiency as they would tend to increase deficits and be
unable to credibly tackle inflationary pressures. Worse still, any attempt to artificially
reduce the unemployment rate would lead inevitably to higher inflation with no effect
beyond the very short term on the unemployment rate. Thus, the standard prescription of

earlier times was replaced by the orthodoxy of central bank independence and,
increasingly a narrow focus on inflation targeting (Bernanke et al 1999). For proponents
of this view, delegating responsibility to an authority which can credibly commit to a
single target is beneficial in increasing macroeconomic efficiency and protecting the
public from a perhaps well meaning, but misguided government.
A movement away from commitment to full employment and towards low targeted
inflation has potentially profound distributional consequences. Despite the claims made
by some that anti-inflationary policy is, for example, pro poor11, it is an empirical
question as to whether inflation or unemployment is seen as a bigger problem by different
individuals. Recent research on inflation versus unemployment aversion (Jayadev 2006,
Scheve 2004) found that the rich are more relatively inflation averse than the poor. The
results presented in this paper further strengthen this idea by finding that relative inflation
aversion is more pronounced among the privileged or elite broadly defined in class terms.
Since class is a critical variable in determining an individual’s labor market opportunities
as well as the source and variability of his or her income, the results make sense. The
findings are in concordance with conflict based models of unemployment and inflation
which argue that macroeconomic policies may have systematically differential effects on
the welfare of workers and owners (as well as on different segments of the working class)
and that the preferences of individuals in separate class positions reflect these differences.
These findings have important consequences for research on the implications of antiinflation versus anti-unemployment policies in general and on the more current debate
around inflation targeting in particular.

11

Dollar and Kraay (2002) for example argue that reducing inflation is “super pro poor”
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Table (I): Summary Statistics
Variable

Source

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Inflation Down
Expert
Semi-Skilled
Unskilled
Subjective Lower class
Subjective Middle class
Subjective Upper Class

V 63: ISSP
Constructed from V202: ISSP
Constructed from V202: ISSP
Constructed from V202: ISSP
V221: ISSP
V221: ISSP
V221: ISSP
Constructed from V213 and
V214: ISSP dataset
Constructed from V217: ISSP
Constructed from V217: ISSP
Constructed from V217: ISSP
Constructed from V217: ISSP
Constructed from V217: ISSP
V 222: ISSP
V 200: ISSP
V 206: ISSP
V 201: ISSP

23824
35313
35313
35313
35313
35313
35313

0.41
0.07
0.23
0.24
0.31
0.49
0.07

0.49
0.25
0.42
0.43
0.46
0.50
0.26

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

35313
35313
35313
35313
35313
35313
35313
35228
35313
35109

0.04
0.15
0.11
0.13
0.11
0.10
0.18
0.52
0.06
44.82

0.19
0.36
0.31
0.34
0.31
0.30
0.38
0.50
0.23
16.65

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
97

Firm Owner
First Income Quintile
Second Income Quintile
Third Income Quintile
Fourth Income Quintile
Fifth Income Quintile
Union Member
Female
Unemployed
Age

Table (II): Logistic Regression of Relative Inflation Aversion on Class Variables
(without controls)
(I)
Variable
Firm Owner

Odds ratio
1.47***

(II)
Zstatistic
(5.53)

Unskilled
Semi-Skilled

Odds ratio

Zstatistic

.69***
.70***

(-6.66)
(-6.44)

Subjective Lower Class
Subjective Middle Class
N

(III)
ZOdds ratio statistic

.69***
.84***
23824

13955

(-6.37)
(-3.15)
20437

Notes: ***= significant at the 1% level, **= significant at the 5% level, *= significant at the 10% level.
Omitted variable is experts (high skilled) in column (II), and subjective upper class in column (III).
Country average inflation dummies are included but not shown.

Table (III): Logistic Regression of Relative Inflation Aversion on Class Variables
(with controls)
(I)
Variable
Firm Owner

Odds ratio
1.20**

(II)
Zstatistic
(2.11)

Unskilled
Semi-Skilled

Odds ratio

Zstatistic

0.87**
0.82***

(-1.98)
(-2.86)

Subjective Lower Class
Subjective Middle Class
Lowest Income Quintile
Second Income Quintile
Third Income Quintile
Fourth Income Quintile
Unemployed
Female
Union Member
Age
N

0.63***
0.73***
0.80***
0.86**
0.70***
0.82***
0.79***
1.00

(-7.95)
(-5.17)
(-3.97)
(-2.50)
(-3.80)
(-5.43)
(-5.10)
(0.97)
14245

(III)
ZOdds ratio statistic

0.66***
0.75***
0.81***
0.92
0.74**
0.80***
0.81***
1.00

(-5.51)
(-3.65)
(-3.18)
(-1.17)
(-1.86)
(-4.75)
(-3.90)
(0.53)
9273

0.75***
0.86**

(-3.72)
(-2.08)

0.68***
0.76***
0.85***
0.89**
0.71***
0.80***
0.80***
1.00

(-6.28)
(-4.24)
(-2.67)
(-1.86)
(-3.58)
(-5.76)
(-4.76)
(1.24)
13469

Notes: ***= significant at the 1% level, **= significant at the 5% level, *= significant at the 10% level.
Omitted variable are experts (high skilled) and highest income quintile in column (II), and subjective upper
class and highest income quintile in column (III). Country average inflation dummies are included but not
shown.
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Appendix 1: Class measures
The ISSP dataset provides ISCO-88 classifications for all but four of the countries. For
each of these countries we have ISCO-68 classifications. Iversen and Soskice, 2001
provide a bridge between these coding mechanisms based on previous work by
Ganzebloom. Using this code (available from Iversen’s webpage at the Harvard School
of Government), I recode all respondents as per ISCO-88 codes. I drop the 300 or so
observations for which there is no bridge available.
Wright, 1997 provides a mechanism by which to classify ISCO-88 classifications into
three skill categories, experts, skilled and low skilled workers. Using the codes provided
by Leilsfrud et al (2005), I replicate these categorizations for the ISSP dataset.
The code is available upon request.

